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Concerns on the eve of elections 
Igor Botan, 15 September 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 37, August 30 - September 12, 2004 
 
With the launch of the fall political season analysts and media alike engaged in 
assessing preparations for parliamentary elections. According to their estimates, 
elections might be held late May or even June next year. The source for such 
predictions is the Constitution itself. Paragraph 3 Article 61 of the Constitution 
provides that "election of Parliament members will be started not later than 3 months 
from the end of the previous mandate or from the dissolution of the previous 
Parliament". Article 63 specifies that "the mandate of the current Parliament may be 
extended until the structure of the new Parliament has been completed and the latter 
can meet in full session" that according to the same article is held "within at most 30 
days from election day". That is why it is considered that Parliament mandate 
commences on the day of its first session. Given that the last parliamentary elections 
were held on February 25, while the Parliament was convened on a first session via a 
Presidential Decree on March 20, 2001, it is expected that parliamentary elections 
would be held sometime during the three months March 21 - June 21, 2005.  
 
This estimation is logical and at the first glance seems accurate. Arguments cited by 
those who claim election date would be set for the end of May or even June cite, 
derive from the supposed interests of the ruling party. It is believed that Party of 
Communists would like to exploit for propaganda purposes April religious holidays 
(Easter) and turn again bringing the Holy Fire from Jerusalem into a political show. 
Celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory day on May 9, in the middle of 
electoral campaign, promises additional political dividends. The more so as the CIS 
chief of states were already invited by President Putin to celebrate the anniversary in 
Moscow. The latter might prove to be crucial in convincing a 30% Russian-speaking 
electorate that President Voronin is on good terms with the Russian leadership.  
 
It is said that by mid-May electorate gets more tolerant with the ruling elite as the 
hardships of winter are long forgotten. This time however winter promises to be 
particularly hard due to the forecasted shortages of electricity and natural gas as a 
result of the would-be "adequate measures" undertaken by Transdnistrian authorities 
in response to so-called "economic blockade" from Chisinau. Given the string of 
provocations contrived by the Tiraspol leaders, it may well happen that the "adequate 
measures" would be scheduled precisely for the cold period of the year, i.e. during 
pre-electoral campaign and would therefore considerably tarnish ruling party's rating.  
Those expectations led some newspapers into believing that worsening relations 
between Moldova and Transdnistria might serve grounds for the governing to declare 
a state of emergency, which would allow it to postpone elections a month or two for a 
more favourable period. In addition, it is said that ruling party would seek to amend 
Constitution so as the President be elected directly by people.  
 
Those speculations should be viewed with scepticism. For a start, the latter 
supposition is no longer valid as according to Article 143 (1) of the Constitution 
"Parliament has the right to pass a law for revising the Constitution after no less than 
6 months from the date when the revising initiative was submitted." Article 74/2 of  
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the Law on Parliament Regulation provides that debates on constitutional laws may 
start only "after six months after the submission of the relevant draft law together with 
the Constitutional Court endorsement". So far no such draft was submitted to the 
Constitutional Court. Therefore, ruling party simply does not have the six months 
necessary for the Constitution revision, as its mandate expires in five months and a 
half, when it would no longer be able to adopt or amend Constitution or any organic 
law.  
 
As for the speculations on declaring a state of emergency, we better not disregard 
those arguments but rather take them seriously. On top of worsening relations 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol, a string of events have happened and numerous quite 
suggestive laws have been passed. Thus, on May 24 President signed a Decree on 
establishing Supreme Security Council (SSC). Opposition dubbed it as President's 
"politburo" or "pet government" seeking to replace Government and "serve dictatorial 
ambitions and usurpation of state power" and having the function of electoral 
headquarters entrusted to bring the victory to the ruling party in the 2005 
parliamentary elections. One month later, on June 24, 2004 Parliament passed the 
Law no. 212-XV on the State of Emergency, Siege and War. About the same time 
government affiliated media predicted that opposition would stage a putsch right on 
the eve of elections, the so-called "Sun Flower" (Moldovan version of the 2003 
Georgian scenario)1. And finally on September 13 the Director of Information and 
Security Service (ISS) announced that "Five persons, including Defence Ministry 
officials were detained in suspicion of embezzling large quantities of weapons from 
the National Army warehouses"2. ISS Director noted "it is quite symptomatic that the 
theft coincided with the escalation of the Transdnistrian conflict and activation of 
certain socio-political forces". In fact it is as symptomatic that SSC Director's 
statement regarding "separatist authorities' inclination towards violent actions" was 
published on the front page of the governmental "Moldova Suverana" besides the 
editorial where the author referring to Russian Federation's support to Transdnistrian 
regime claimed that "all the appeals by the international community to Russian 
Federation are made to it as a guarantor-country, but they should be made to an 
aggressor state, as it was publicly acknowledged in the ECHR' judgement on Ilascu 
case". Quite bold allegations from official press given the approaching negotiations 
between Moldovan Government and Gazprom on the country's debt on gas.  
 
Insinuation on "activation of socio-political forces" is also quite obvious, referring to 
the opposition parties' support to Teleradio-Moldova journalists in strike. Major 
opposition parties voiced their support to the protesting journalists and pointed that 
upcoming elections would not be free and fair unless Teleradio-Moldova issue is 
settled, meaning it is no longer under governors' control. To maximize protest actions 
that are going on for two months now, it was planned to move them downtown close 
to main public institutions. Under those circumstances, when governors identified 
their domestic foes (opposition and Transdnistrian regime) and foreign ones (Romania 
-" the last European empire", Ukraine - allowing smuggling from Transdnistria 
through its 460 km border with Republic of Moldova and Russia - "aggressor-state 
which the West refuses to treat accordingly"), a dramatic deterioration of socio-
political situation is to be expected right on the eve of elections.  
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Going back to the date of elections, it is worth mentioning that the aforesaid 
arguments do not take into account some important political and legal factors. Firstly, 
they ignore Resolution no.31 of 10.11.1997 of the Constitutional Court providing that 
"Parliament mandate commences on election day and ends after 4 years". This ruling 
is quite interesting, meaning that for about a month there are in fact two Parliaments 
in the Republic of Moldova. The new one, whose mandate commences on election 
day and the old one whose mandate is extended for about one month until the former 
convenes on its first session. In fact, this curiosity does not bear any risk. Anyway 
Constitutional Court rulings are final and binding for all. In this particular case, 
Court's ruling narrows only by one month the berth for manoeuvres to ruling party in 
setting election date. However, in line with Article 2 of the Law on the Procedure of 
Electing the President of the Republic of Moldova, presidential elections are to be 
held "at most 45 days prior to mandate expiry of the incumbent President". The first 
article of the same law, amended in June, provides that "Parliament of the same 
legislature gets to elect the President of the Republic of Moldova only once". The 
incumbent Parliament has already elected the President once, therefore by April 8, 
2005 when the President's mandate expires, a new Parliament should be elected so as 
to be able to elect a new President within the time frame allotted by the law.  
 
Therefore if the governors were to abide Constitutional provisions and electoral law 
on parliamentary and presidential elections, then by the end of its session in 
December Parliament would set the date for parliamentary elections. The latter would 
therefore be held in the last Sunday of February or any Sunday in the first half of 
March, i.e. February 27 - March 13, 2005. And this because sufficient time should be 
allotted: to tabulate election results, Constitutional Court to validate election results, 
President to convene the newly-elected Parliament, Parliament to elect its governing 
bodies, establish Special Commission for the Presidential Elections, and conduct 
those elections by April 8, 2005. Most importantly, Constitutional Court ruled in its 
Resolution no. 4 of 12.01.2001 that terms for presidential elections specified in an 
organic law should be strictly observed.  
 
Under the given circumstances, Government would better dispel lingering concerns, 
rapidly settled Teleradio Moldova conflict, and conduct elections under the aforesaid 
terms. It would be a terrible mistake for the main state institutions - Parliament and 
Presidency - to operate longer under expired mandates and respectively limited 
prerogatives, especially given tensed relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol pushed 
to the brink of renewed conflict.  
 
1 Puciul "Floarea soarelui", Accente libere, #15, 8.07.2004 ("Sunflower" putsch)  
2 Din depozitele armatei nationale a fost susrtras armament, Moldova Suverana, # 
152-153, 14.09.2004 (Weapons were stolen from the National Army warehouses)  
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Astana Summit: an evidence to the CIS crisis 
Igor Botan, 29 September 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 38, 13-26 September, 2004 
 
 
President Voronin's ostentatious absence from CIS Summit  
 
President Voronin's absence from the Astana Summit held on September 15-16 is an 
illustration of the worsening relations between Republic of Moldova and Russia.  
 
The reasons cited by Voronin for not attending the Summit indicate his elaborate and 
consistent position on Community of Independent States (CIS). One year ago, during 
the Yalta Summit Vladimir Voronin severely criticized Single Economic Area (SEA) 
established by four industrialized CIS states: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and 
Belarus, seeking to create mutual benefits that other CIS members were denied. Back 
then Moldovan President warned that SEA would undermine CIS itself and would 
turn it into a mere discussion club. In his latest interview to Novosti-Moldova Agency 
reprinted by the governmental Moldova Suverana1 Vladimir Voronin reiterated the 
same arguments pointing that the four countries had some common pragmatic 
interests, that is, to synchronize their economic policies in view of joining WTO. In 
Astana leaders of the four SEA founders had a separate agenda, which included: 
follow up on the enforcement of the Yalta agreements; defining priorities and 
documents that are to be signed in the future; developing a single mechanism for VAT 
taxation; and simplifying travel and communications between those countries. The 
rest of CIS heads of states had to simply confine themselves with the status of 
Russia's loyal partners, who in the aftermath of terrorist attacks sought to fight 
terrorism, organized crime, drug smuggling and illegal migration - issues that topped 
the agenda of the Astana Summit. Under those circumstances, President Voronin 
decided that Prime Minister was suited enough to tackle those issues.  
 
Still those excuses are not compelling enough. And there are a number of reasons for 
this. Firstly, great majority of the CIS states, who were also not invited into SEA, did 
attend Astana Summit, including Caucasus countries that are struggling with the same 
kind of secessionism problems Moldova is, whose resolution greatly depends on 
Russia.  
 
Secondly, following July informal CIS Summit in Moscow there were all the reasons 
to expect that Azerbaijan and Georgian Presidents, and not Moldovan President, 
would not show up at the Astana Summit. The former refused to sign the Declaration 
criticizing OSCE, drafted at the initiative of President Putin. Probably they realized 
that despite OSCE' deficiencies, its documents (including Final Act and those signed 
at 1999 Istanbul Summit) were the cornerstones of regional security. Albeit anti-
OSCE Declaration did not target the gist of the organization, but only some of its 
facets, the two Caucasus Presidents struggling with secessionism refrained from 
signing it. Having said that, one may well understand why Armenian President allied 
with Russia against OSCE, as did other countries that do not struggle with 
secessionism and have Russian troops stationed on there soil, however one fails to  
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comprehend Moldovan President's decision to endorse the document, even if only 
conditionally.  
 
Thirdly, neither of the Caucasus President ever voiced their attachment to CIS in 
general, and Russia in particular, as did President Voronin. Nevertheless, they flew to 
Astana to discuss issues of common interest, while Georgian Mihail Saakashvili even 
conditioned his solidarity with Russia in its efforts to fight terrorism by its refraining 
from double standards when resolving secessionist conflicts it had inspired. The 
contrast with the behaviour displayed by Moldovan President becomes even more 
striking if considering Article 27 of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation 
between Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation, thereby contracting parties 
undertake to cooperate within CIS, or Article 14 of the same document thereby they 
undertake to cooperate in fighting "terrorism, drug smuggling" etc. Those were 
exactly the issues topping the agenda of the last CIS Summit. Therefore Voronin's 
absence may only be viewed as an ostentatious dodge from his obligations undertaken 
via the Law on Ratifying the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. Still there is much 
more to this.  
 
 
Russia's aspirations and their impact  
 
Astana Summit was held just after the series of terrorist attacks by Chechen 
secessionists in Russia, from the murder of the Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov 
on May 9 to Beslan tragedy in early September. That is why Russia needed CIS heads 
of states to commit fighting terrorism. At the very same time, Russian leadership and 
its foreign affairs took actions and made statements highlighting their attitude towards 
secessionist regimes throughout CIS.  
 
For instance, secessionists in Abkhazia and North Osetia enjoy the support of the 
Russian Duma Deputy Speaker, Dmitriy Rogozin. During Ajara crisis last spring two 
of the forefathers of the Transdnistrian secessionist regime - member of the State 
Duma Victor Alksnis and General Iurii Netkacev, former commander of the 14th 
Army - flew to Batumi to share "positive experience" of the Transdnistrian success 
story. However Russian officials' cynicism reached its highest at the time terrorists 
held more then one thousand hostages in a Beslan school. At that time Transdnestrian 
separatist regime was celebrating the 14th anniversary of its independence. Deputy 
Speaker of the Russian State Duma, Serghei Baburin, attending the ceremony stated: 
"Assessing the situation on Dniester, we should acknowledge the reality: Moldova 
consists of two states - Dniester Moldovan Republic and Republic of Moldova, 
Transdniestrians have proven already that they have the right to their own destiny …  
 
Neither economic blockade nor the attempts to withdraw from the Memorandum 
where Dniester Moldovan Republic is acknowledged as a state, would change the 
reality"2. Yet another Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, Vladimir Jirinovski, sent 
his congratulations to Transdnistrian leader Igor Smirnov reading "by joining our 
efforts we would be able to get Dniestrian Moldovan Republic recognized and later 
on joined to Russian Federation"3. Thus, secessionist leaders presenting themselves as 
internationalists have the committed nationalists in Russia among their supporters.  
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Indeed, Baburin, Rogozin, Jirinovskii (all Deputy Speakers of the Russian Duma 
sharing nationalist and chauvinist ideals) are so-far marginal political players; 
however in the past they were voicing things Kremlin would not dare as it was bound 
to diplomatic etiquette. All of the aforesaid is already known, though under crisis 
those facts look different. President of the National Strategy Institute, Serghei 
Belkovski, boasting his closeness to Kremlin, explained why Russia needs 
secessionist regimes throughout CIS, namely "Unknown states are the ones enabling 
Russia to keep the levers of influence tight in its hands, to take the role of arbitrator 
and mediator in conflicts throughout post-Communist area, and keep its military 
presence in the farthest corners of CIS, which results in a mono-polar structure in CIS. 
The belt consisting of unrecognized states is nothing but a tool for securing Russia's 
presence in the trouble spots of the former URSS. Once this belt disappears Russia 
would loose its role as a moderator in the post-soviet area. Under given 
circumstances, CIS would break apart and would be replaced by a conglomerate of 12 
equal countries, each of them directly addressing its problems together with global 
players (USA, EU, China) or regional ones (Turkey, Iran), while Moscow would no 
longer be an attraction pole for them"4. Of course, political scientist's words should 
also be taken with a grain of salt; still the judgement of the European Court for 
Human Rights on "Ilascu case" proves that he was right.  
 
On the other hand, the main Kremlin strategist, President of the Efficient Policy 
Foundation, Gleb Pavlovski, identified the main foes in the aftermath of Beslan and 
explained why Russia would not allow conflicts it had inspired and frozen throughout 
CIS to be defrozen: "It's hard to identify the enemy in a modern world. Individuals 
and organizations, which in some cases are our diplomatic partners, in others support 
killers, like Brussels which legitimizes them by calling them insurgents. Another 
example - strengthened EU promotes an enlargement doctrine, raising the issue of 
defreezing old conflicts in Caucasus and Black Sear. As the notion of security is an 
essential one for Brussels, it is also applied to the neighbouring territories, i.e. 
Bessarabia, Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Osetia, and Armenia so as to take an 
account of the territories at its borders. Those conflicts were frozen by us as part of 
another approach - national security that operated in the last 10 years. Saakashvili that 
plays the card of defreezing conflicts does it because he needs US and Europe support 
and is trying to get them in the game. In fact Basaev was the one to benefit from 
Saakashvili defreezing the conflict. Russia is entitled to rephrase the question to 
Saakashvili as follows: we are certain that those who plotted Beslan terrorist act 
wouldn't have chosen North Osetia as their target, if Georgia had not defrozen South 
Osetia conflict"5.  
 
Pavlovski's statement came immediately after Beslan and on the eve of CIS Summit. 
In Astana Georgian President picked up the issues raised by Pavlovski saying "It is 
important not to apply double standards in addressing problems under litigation. We 
know far too well who the terrorists are. Let's take Basaev. In mid 90's he was a hero 
for secessionists in Abkazia, whose hands a stained in blood"6. In response Vladimir 
Putin indicated that "economic sanctions and military pressure wouldn't bring any 
results. This is not the path leading to the House of God". The curious thing here is 
that West has been sending this message to Putin for some time now when referring to 
ways of settling Chechen conflict, however it declined it. Thus, what is Russia may do 
in Chechnya, Georgia may not in South Osetia and Abkhazia. Russia may venture to 
inspire secessionist movements that it would later freeze so as to keep its military  
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presence in CIS countries, whose independence and sovereignty it recognized. 
However CIS countries are not allowed to defreeze conflicts on its soil if it does not 
suit Russia's interests. Those who make such attempts are viewed as enemies. Under 
those circumstances, Russian officials call on the West to give up on "double 
standards"7. On September 23, Russian Foreign Minister, Serghei Lavrov, introduced 
a UN draft resolution "On better interaction in fighting global terrorism". Albeit it is a 
very important, one should not forget that in the case of Russia terrorism is deeply 
rooted in secessionism. That is why one should not confuse the cause and effect, that 
is, the correct wording of the draft resolution should be "in fighting secessionism and 
terrorism". Russia wants to exploit the interference of secessionism and Islamic 
terrorism so as to replace the former with the latter. Obsession about Western "double 
standards" would simply vanish if Russia was to apply the same criteria in dealing 
with secessionist conflicts in CIS.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Clearly, the way political and economic issues are addressed in CIS greatly 
undermine the future of this structure. The fate of SEA remains unclear due to the 
economic selfishness of Russia. Elections in Kazakhstan, electoral campaign in 
Ukraine, and referendum initiated by Lukashenko in Belarus on extending the number 
of presidential mandates - all of them indicate that they slide towards authoritarianism 
as is Russia. It is all-too-clear that "verticals of power" generates new conflicts. As for 
the three Central Asian countries, they are confronted with too specific problems to 
contribute to CIS stability.  
 
As for the Caucasus countries, they don't place much hope in the CIS development, 
but rather hope Russia would play a positive role in settling the conflicts they are 
trying to get to grips. "I believe Russia should play a positive role in conflict 
resolution. There is potential for negotiations" those were the words of President 
Saakashvili at the Astana Summit.  
 
The fact that President Voronin did not use the CIS Summit as an opportunity to talk 
with President Putin and Kucima about Transdnistrian conflict resolution signals that 
the potential for negotiations in the current five-sided format with the participation of 
Russia and Ukraine has been fully exhausted. Voronin's absence at Astana comes as a 
surprise, considering his statement on Independence Day "There would be no 
negotiations with Tiraspol. We would only continue the dialogue with those whom 
Tiraspol reports directly to". Refraining to mention who they are, President Voronin 
claims the 460 km border with Ukraine are open to smuggling "bringing dividends to 
Tiraspol, Ukraine, and Russia to such an extent as it defies international law". On 
September 1 in an interview to BBC President Voronin reiterated "Transdnistrian 
regime is a marionette one controlled by Russia and Ukraine". Therefore, one may 
well understand why President Voronin refuses to sit at the negotiation table with 
"Tiraspol marionette", however it's strange why he refuses to talk to "puppeteers from 
Moscow and Kiev" as he had promised in his message on Independence Day.  
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In fact, in his statement Voronin accused Russia of violating Article 5 of the 
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed by the Republic of Moldova and Russian 
Federation on 19.12.2001, providing that "Parties condemn secessionism in all its 
forms and undertake to refrain from supporting secessionist movements". By doing so 
he probably wanted to anticipate any accusations to Moldova alleging it failed to 
comply with its cooperation obligations within CIS. The move would have some 
serious consequences which would be the subject of separate consideration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 "Integrarea Moldovei in structurile europene nu necesita iesirea din cadrul CSI" 
(Joining European structures does not require Republic of Moldova to leave CIS), 
Moldova suverana, nr.155, 16.09.2004  
2 http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol13-09-04.htm  
3 http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol11-09-04.htm  
4 "Начало трагедии" (Beginning of a tragedy), Ведомости, 12.05.04  
5 "Судороги рождения нации" (Nation labor pains), Русский журнал, 4.09.04  
6 "СНГ - страна советов" (CIS - country of the soviets), GazetaSNG.ru, 17.09.04  
7 "Лавров пытался разобраться с англичанами на нейтральной территории" 
(Lavrov tried to deal with the Brits on neutral grounds), Независимая газета,¹206, 
24.09.04 
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To friends - everything, to enemies - the law 
Igor Botan, 20 October 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 39, 27 September - 17 October, 2004 
 
Relations between main political players have morphed into a full-fledged 
information war. With the elections coming, this information war is set to escalate. 
Media largely reports on the way scores are settled with political foes, on public and 
disguised threats, on arrests of the key followers of political foes; that has turned 
information wart into the main instrument of political fight. It seeks to denigrate 
political foes and tarnish their image. Albeit in Moldova as in other post-communist 
countries information wars have always gone hand in hand with political fight thus 
becoming an attribute of the multiparty system development, with the comeback of 
Communists to power it has got a new twist.  
 
Ruling party has launched a number of information wars and it waged them without 
any scruples. Nor did opposition parties hesitate to denigrate their foes. Hence, the 
means and possibilities of each side are quite different, to say the least, therefore their 
impact is also quite different.  
 
 
a) Previous ruling party's information campaigns against its political foes  
 
Once they got to power in February 2001, Communists did not bothered 
distinguishing between state-owned and public media outlets that it subdued; or 
private or party affiliated outlets that it widely used in polishing its image while 
denigrating political foes. Information wars varied in intensity depending on political 
opportunity. What is striking is that Communist party media has been much more 
critical of the party achievements than the state-owned or public media. Currently, 
Communist party is the only party endowed with financial, administrative, and media 
resources allowing it to conduct a successful electoral campaign.  
 
Let us consider the main stages of the "multi-vectorial" and "asymmetric" information 
campaign started by Communist party against its political foes:  
 
1. The first campaign targeted at "people of the former President Lucinski" in the 
Vasile Tarlev's Government voted by communist parliamentary majority, was 
launched on October 23, 2001 when President Voronin addressed the Government 
with the following message: "Not only, transformations that we have started bring no 
visible results, but they also might push us to the brink of a political crisis. It might 
end with us loosing the power. Loosing the power is not only the problem of the party 
itself or President for that matter. The country may not develop without any political 
stability. If the new power falls, political instability would take over the country for 
many years ahead, this might lead to the disappearance of the Republic of Moldova, 
or even worse, corrupt clans would take over the power in the country. Then, in 
conspiracy with the incumbent power in the Moldovan Dniester Republic they would 
turn Moldova into a "black hole" of the region governed by corrupted power that 
would exploit the people to its own advantage".  
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A number of articles followed President's message targeting Ministers believed to be 
"people of the former President Lucinski". Initially, Prime-Minister Tarlev himself 
was among those accused of economic sabotage. Observers said the campaign sought 
to redistribute control over much-coveted branches of economy and private 
businesses. The campaign ended with the first massive "cleansing" in Government, 
followed by many others. Undoubtedly, the campaign was a successful one.  
 
2. About the same time an information war against separatist leader in Transdnistria, 
Igor Smirnov, was launched so as to prevent his re-election. This time, however the 
campaign was a failure. Smirnov was re-elected with a landslide victory, while 
relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol deteriorated and ended in a deadlock.  
 
3. Several months later a new information war was started. This time it was targeted 
at Christian Democratic Peoples' Party that at the time was staging protest rallies 
against revision of history curricula in schools and obligatory Russian language 
courses in primary schools. Meanwhile, on the pretext of fighting corruption, state-
owned media targeted concrete individuals, namely: Gagauz-Yeri Governor; Minister 
of Economy and his Deputy; and more importantly Chisinau Mayor Serafim 
Urechean.  
 
The latter was the big target. On the eve of early local elections scheduled for April 7, 
2002 governmental media and national TV accused Urechean of lack of managerial 
skills in administering capital city, corruption, and most importantly of heading "the 
mafia" in the Republic of Moldova.  
 
The results of the campaign remain contradictory. Former Gagauz-Yeri Governor 
accused by President of frittering money away was ousted, however later on he was 
appointed as Republic of Moldova Ambassador to WTO in Geneva. As for Minister 
of Economy, Andrei Cucu, he was replaced by Stefan Odagiu close to Prime-Minister 
Tarlev, while his Deputy Marian Lupu accused by the President of smuggling kept his 
position, later on he became Minister of Economy and one of the most influential 
persons in the Cabinet of Ministers due to his high professionalism. Those were the 
"victims sacrificed" in the war against "people of Lucinski" and "Smirnov 
supporters".  
As regards, the flak against Mayor Serafim Urechean, behind whom stood the very 
same Lucinski as the press alleged, it was a pre-electoral "false start". The fact is that 
a ruling of the Constitutional Court made it impossible to hold early local elections.  
 
4. The next information war began with the approach of May 2003 local elections. 
Serafim Ureachean running for mayoralty and at that time leader of "Moldova 
Noastra" electoral block was the main target. That was the dirtiest campaign ever. 
Final OSCE report reads "heavily biased state media providing distorted information 
to voters". Nevertheless, Communists have lost the battle as they failed to accomplish 
their main goal - throwing out Urechean from Chisinau Mayoralty.  
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b) Ruling party's new information campaigns against its political foes  
 
Early this year a new information war started against a possible consolidation of 
opposition forces on the eve of 2005 parliamentary elections. Communist leader 
realized the danger of such a consolidation when opposition parties came together on 
November 24, 2003 under the Committee for Defending Independence and 
Constitution thus opposing his initiative to sign "Kozak Memorandum". Yet another 
reason for launching a war against opposition was the declaration issued by Christian 
Democratic Peoples' Party "On the need to keep opposition united" addressed to 
opposition leaders members of the Committee. Christian Democrats wanted 
opposition to go "as a single electoral block" in the parliamentary elections because 
"that is the only formula able to bring an alternative ruling".  
 
To put an end to the would-be unification drive among opposition parties, ruling party 
has started the procedure of suspending Christian-Democrats MPs' parliamentary 
immunity. That in turn enabled a penal investigation against them to be started for 
staging unauthorised protest rallies and burning Russian Federation state symbols in 
protest for Russia's failure to comply with undertaken engagements at Istanbul OSCE 
Summit, i.e. withdrawing its troops from Transdnistria.  
 
Later, in March when the negations on establishing Democratic Moldova Bloc had 
started, whose leader Serafim Urechean was set to become political foe no.1 of the 
Communist Party, governmental Moldova Suverana published an anonymous article 
taken from "Novosti Moldovi" agency reading: "investigations against Mayor 
Urechean and a number of decision makers in Mayoralty and organisations in its 
subordination are almost completed …", "Investigation on embezzlement of industrial 
machinery worth 8 million Lei by Chisinau Mayoralty in the person of Serafim 
Urechean." As a result of this illegal and unfair deal, "NFJ-Gazgrup" had a huge gain. 
In addition, investigation of Urechean abuses, in particular signing a guarantee letter 
to Energoimpexgrup enabling it to take a bank loan, without prior approval of the 
Municipal Council…"1.  
 
Curiously, when asked to comment on investigations, Serafim Urechean knew 
nothing about them; he himself had learned from the press about investigations 
against him, not to speak that the prosecution was ready to go to court.  
 
The aforesaid examples illustrate that ruling party is determined to stick to its 
propaganda campaigns against political foes by using all the means at hand and public 
institutions. Most importantly, with the elections coming additional backup measures 
were taken so as to increase the effect of the informational war. Probably, they 
resorted to new measures because the previous ones were not successful.  
 
Apparently, the aforesaid allegations made by governmental media needed a legal 
back-up to gain more credibility. In this respect, on May 24 President signed a Decree 
on establishing Supreme Security Council (SSC). Its new enlarged membership 
included Prosecutor General, Head of the Centre for Combating Economic Crime and 
Corruption (CCECC). In the eyes of opposition leaders the new SSC was a 
"politburo", "pet government" of the President that was to serve as "electoral 
headquarters that shall bring the victory to the ruling party in the upcoming 
parliamentary elections".  
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One may well understand opposition's fears. Article 12 of the Law on State Security 
provides that "President approves the number, membership, responsibilities, and 
action plan of the SSC". And opposition fears have been brought to fruition recently. 
Media2 has come in possession of a SSC Secretary's letter of 30.07.2004 addressed to 
the President, asking his consent for CCECC and Prosecution, i.e. newly appointed 
members of the SSC, to examine within a month "all the cases of abuses and 
violations" elucidated in the Court of Accounts resolution no. 44 of 2.07.2004 on 
"Results of control over developing and enforcing Chisinau Municipality budget for 
year 2003". That letter had President's resolution on it, thereby he consented 
"Organize the execution".  
 
Article 6 of the Law on State Security outlines basic principles for ensuring state 
security, among them legality and opportunity. Article 4 of the same law clearly 
provides that "cases of organized crime and/or corruption undermine state security". 
That's why, in principle, Court of Accounts' resolution on "Results of control over 
developing and enforcing Chisinau Municipality budget for year 2003" might serve as 
grounds for invoking the opportunity of CCECC and Prosecution undertaking control. 
At the first glance everything seems legal, however at a closer look there are two 
other principles outlined in Article 6, namely non-partisanship and equality under 
law. Several issues arise in this respect.  
 
A closer look at the resolutions no. 44 and 45 of the Court of Accounts of July 2004 
as regards enforcement of the budgets in Chisinau, Balti and rayons of the country 
leads us to the conclusion that negative trends mentioned in the SSC letter to the 
President are common not only to Chisinau Municipality, but also to Balti and the rest 
of the country's rayons. Irregularities found in Chisinau are not more severe than, lets 
say, in Balti where the Court of Accounts specifically requested CCECC to interfere. 
Noteworthy, as a result of local elections almost all 31 rayons and Balti Municipality 
are controlled by Communists. It is even more interesting that Court of Accounts 
resolution no. 53 of 23.07.2004 found similar irregularities after controlling Ministry 
of Transportation and Communications headed by Vasile Zgardan, Communist Party 
candidate in local elections competing with Serafim Urechean.  
 
SSC din not follow-up on the aforesaid irregularities, while the state media remained 
tight lipped. In such cases, governors undertake some quite curious measures. Thus 
via presidential decree no.985-XIII of 13.11.2002 Anatol Cuptov, former Minister of 
Transportation promoted by the President was ousted. He was publicly accused by the 
President of embezzlement. The curious thing is that several weeks after being ousted 
Mr. Cuptov was appointed via Governmental resolution no. 1566 of 6.12.2002 as 
senior manager of the state enterprise "Giurgiulesti Commercial Port".  
 
Going back to the campaign against Chisinau Mayoralty, it is quite interesting that 
although on August 31 one month passed since the deadline set by SSC Secretary for 
control, actions undertaken by authorities in September had little if nothing to do with 
irregularities found by the Court of Accounts. Practically, all the previous allegations 
made by state media on the alleged investigations against Urechean were forgotten. 
On September 24, CCECC arrested three Municipality employees for "misinforming 
Municipal Council" that allegedly resulted in illegal privatisation by a private 
company of a 0.42 hectare plot in downtown in view of constructing a hotel. The 
curious thing is that there is a decision of the Economic College of the Supreme Court  
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of Justice (SCJ)3 confirming the legality of the transaction, however General 
Prosecutor appealed in SCJ Economic Court decision. Several days later, Prime-
Minister Vasile Tarlev, also member of the SSC, issued a resolution no. 1071 "On 
controlling the legality of allotting plots for construction in Chisinau Municipality". 
Under the resolution, Department of Constructions and Territory Planning, Ministry 
of Interior, State Cadastre Agency assisted by the territorial office of the State 
Chancellery, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, and License Chamber 
had to verify within one month the "information on the irregularities found" while 
granting 546 plots and "issuing construction authorizations".  
 
In fact, there are many questions as to how Mayoralty allotted the 546 plots to private 
companies and natural entities, especially as the decision was taken on a weekend in 
the eve of municipal elections of May 25, 2003. That alone was a reason enough for 
the state TV and radio to engage with new forces in yet another campaign against 
political foes of the ruling party. Reports and articles like "Corruption campaign" pop 
up one after another about "Serafim Urechean, also known as opposition leader..."4 
Undoubtedly, allotment of plots would remain the "cherry on the cake" of the 
campaign against centrist opposition headed by Serafim Urechean. State media 
already discovered prosecutors, judges, employees of the Ministry of Interior and 
Court of Accounts, and many other moguls among the beneficiaries of the plots. 
Those details are probably used to show that all the previous campaigns to fight 
corruption in Chisinau Municipality have failed. Apparently, this last campaign is 
intended to be a very successful one for the governors, and at the same time a big 
blow on centrist opposition.  
 
Christian-Democrats were not neglected either. During one of the recent sessions of 
the Parliament, at the initiative of Communist deputies, including Chair of the 
Parliament Commission on State Security, also member of the SSC it was decided to 
establish an investigation commission that would check how Christian Democrat 
leader Iurie Rosca came into possession of several real estates, a newspaper and a 
printing house. Rosca's claims that his property was legal, declared, and all the taxes 
has been paid attracted a new storm of accusations, this time as regards his alleged 
involvement in money forgery as reported by Ukraine Special Service. The move was 
also aimed to denigrate the leader in the eyes of his electorate, but mainly raise 
discord among the party members. Apparently, it was no longer possible to prosecute 
Christian-Democrat leaders for burning Russian state symbols in February during 
unauthorised protest rallies and it was necessary to find fresh target. Indeed, several 
months ago Moldovan President launched a campaign against Russia for supporting 
Transdnistrian secessionism.  
 
All the aforesaid examples pose the reasonable question: do authorities and SSC 
really observe the principles of non-partisanship and equality of all under law, as 
provided for in the Law on State Security, when they claim to fight corruption? This 
seems to be a rhetoric question, especially as the President himself answered the 
question immediately after 2003 local elections in his message of June 11, 2003 
addressed to voters - "Mayor Urechean shall learn a lesson"5. He continued "as a 
President, I have univocally opposed Serafim Urechean's candidature". Rather, 
during the electoral campaign President endorsed Communist candidate Vasile 
Zgardan. The thing is that Court of Accounts found similar irregularities in the 
Ministry of Transportation under the incumbent Vasile Zgardan and his predecessors,  
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Anatol Cuptov and Vasile Iovv who were also affiliated or even members of the 
Communist Parthy, nevertheless SSC headed by the President chose to investigate 
only Serafim Urechean. In fact, may the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, 
Chair of the Supreme Security Council be a party member or not? If so, then how can 
the principles of non-partisanship and equality under law be observed when it 
comes to fighting corruption that undermines state security? When the President acts 
as an electoral player, he does so in the name of the people as provided in Article 2 of 
the Constitution, or in the name and in favour of Communist Party? Until the 
interested persons find an answer to this question, Republic of Moldova citizens may 
get the impression that so far, in this country the principle outlined by Franco is 
triumphing: To friends - everything, to enemies - the law!  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Indeed, opposition parties undertake campaigns or even wide scale information wars 
of their own targeted against ruling party. The latter should be considered separately. 
The major distinction, however, is that ruling party resorts to state-owned media when 
waging information wars against its political foes. The negative side of both ruling 
and opposition' campaigns is that electorate is left with the impression that all the 
political elite is corrupt in Moldova. Only that ruling party may protect "its own 
corrupt ones", by directing political flak at opposition. So far, no judgement was 
issued by a Moldovan court against high-rank moguls or party leaders accused of 
corruption. However, it is this issue that is widely exploited during information wars.  
The situation might radically change on the eve of 2005 parliamentary elections by 
applying the aforesaid formula. And this of course unless the targets back off and 
accept much-coveted positions of ambassadors, managers of important institutions, 
etc. Again, this might not be the case, as it is too late and things have gone too far 
already, to the extend that "execution" has become inevitable.  
 
 
 
 
1 "Un sir de dosare deschise primarului de Chisinau sint aproape finalizate" (A 
number of investigations against Chisinau Mayor almost completed), Moldova 
suverana, nr. 42, 17.03.2004  
2 "Generalul a ordonat "Organizati executarea" (General ordered "Organize 
execution"), Timpul, nr.36, 01.10.2004  
3 "Voronin a dat startul electoral al represiunilor politice" (Voronin launched political 
repressions), Timpul, nr.36, 01.10.2004  
4 "Caravana coruptiei" (Corruption campaign), Moldova suverana, nr.170, 6.10.2004  
5 "Primarul Urechean trebuie sa traga invatminte", Moldova suverana, nr. 106, 
11.06.2003 
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"3D" strategy - from "extremism" to consensus? 
Oazu Nantoi, 3 November 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 40, 18 October - 31 October, 2004 
 
Immediately after the armed conflict in the Eastern regions of the Republic of 
Moldova (Transdniester) in the summer of 1992, the interest of Moldovan society to 
that issue was fading. Politicians of every ideological stripe that succeeded each other 
in power have unofficial set a taboo on Transdnistrian conflict. It didn't come to the 
mind of Moldovan governors to question the format of the peacekeeping troops in the 
security zone, as it was outlined on July 21, 1992 in the "Agreement on Peaceful 
Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transdniester Region of the Republic of 
Moldova", document that in fact legalized paramilitary structures of the so-called 
Moldovan Dniestrian Republic (MDR). As for the Russian troops and munitions 
illegally located on the soil of the Republic of Moldova, there were of more concern 
to Americans than domestic patriots.  
 
While governors and opposition were jostling for influence, the generous gesture 
made by Chisinau on February 7, 1996 when it handed over to Tiraspol customs seals 
of the Republic of Moldova, was left unnoticed. Back then Igor Smirnov decided it 
was the right time to appoint his son as the Chair of the State Customs Committee. 
Even the Memorandum of May 8, 1997 being truly unconstitutional was left 
unnoticed by the Moldovan society as it was struggling with dire social-economic 
straits. Indeed, politicians and public officials in Chisinau who realized that in 
political meddling with Tiraspol they might earn a fortune, fully exploited this apathy 
in society.  
 
Thus Moldovan society was split into two parallel worlds. One - society indifferent to 
the conflict. The other - the underworld merged with the political elite in Chisinau, 
Kiev and Moscow that fully benefited of the "frozen" conflict. Sporadic attempts by 
journalists, publicists to draw the attention of the public to the things happening 
failed, but those who dared to speak up were immediately labelled as "extremists" .  
 
In the spring of 2000 Institute for Public Policies embarked on studying regional 
conflicts and Transdniestrian conflict in particular. Step by step a number of studies 
were produced, all of them pointing to the effect that both the "unique" formula of the 
peacekeeping forces and "five-sided" negotiated format were imposed so as to allow 
Russian Federation to keep the situation under its control and prevent the resolution of 
the conflict.  
 
Things started to change immediately after parliamentary elections of February 2001. 
Reintegration of the country has taken centre stage. In many of his declaration and 
actions President Voronin draw public's attention to the Transdnistrian issue, teetering 
from huge concessions to Tiraspol to dubbing Igor Smirnov "bandit and mafia", move 
followed by the introduction of new customs seals.  
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The idea to settle Transdnistrian conflict by turning Republic of Moldova into a 
federative state was yet another challenge for the Moldovan society. For the first time, 
West formed a joint front with OSCE and Russia and endorsed the initiative. For the 
first time the pages of governmental media were open to opposition forces to have 
their say on the federalisation. Debates that followed highlighted the weaknesses of 
the federalization idea - holding a referendum and questionable viability of the 
federative state established by mechanically assembling Transdnistrian regime, 
dubbed as criminal by Moldovan authorities, and what currently is the Republic of 
Moldova. None of the proponents of federalization was able to tell what would 
happen to the Republic of Moldova in case the referendum on federalization was to 
fail, or how viable the "reunited" state would be if the repressive structures of the 
Tiraspol regime were not eliminated first.  
 
3D strategy was launched in the summer of 2003 after it became clear that ideas 
formulated in IPP's studies needed a "packaging" able to compete with the 
"federalisation" formula. The end-goal was very clear while developing the 3D 
strategy. The reintegrated state was to become viable, democratic, prosperous, 
European-oriented and "immune" to any recurrence of secessionism. This is feasible 
as citizens on both sides of Dniester do not view each other as enemies. This last 
thing, has led us to the conclusion that Igor Smirnov's clan should not be allowed to 
the negotiation table, as it represents foreign geopolitical and economic-criminal 
interests and seeks to hinder conflict resolution.  
 
Respectively, 3D strategy provides for eliminating all the obstacles for the 
reintegration of the Republic of Moldova, establishing efficient mechanisms and 
mobilizing resources necessary. At the same time, the strategy also envisages 
blocking any possibility for Tiraspol regime to pursue the aforesaid interests 
(geopolitical and international organized crime network) that kept them alive. The gist 
of the strategy resumes to three major goals - Demilitarization of the Moldovan 
Dniestrian Republic (withdrawing Russian Federation troops and dismantling its 
MDR's potential) Decriminalization of the entire region by halting smuggling and 
Democratization of the Republic of Moldova as a whole.  
 
3D strategy includes a psychological element as well - for 15 years MDR's public 
opinion is manipulated; it was raised in the fear for the enemy from the right bank of 
Dniester. It would take time to demolish those stereotypes, time in which some 
positive expectations should be brought to the people of Transdnistria as regards 
perspective of country reintegration, democratization of entire society, and European 
future of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
In the summer of 2004 a group of independent experts from Moldova and abroad 
decided to draft and present to the public 3D strategy and a Road Map that would 
clearly outline to be undertaken actions and responsibilities of the actors involved in 
the process of reintegrating Moldova. This initiative of the civil society has a twofold 
goal. On the one hand, to provide a document to the political elite and society at large 
that would pave the way to a national consensus on settling Transdnistrian conflict. 
Similarly, 3D and Road Map are to show the West that at last Republic of Moldova 
has realized what it wants as regards Transdnistrian conflict, that it knows how to 
reintegrate the country and is ready to assume its share of responsibility. So far twenty 
six NGOs endorsed the document that was presented to the major political parties of 
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 Moldova. Latest declarations made by President Voronin as regards Transdnistrian 
conflict are to a large extend in line with the main principles of 3D strategy. 
Apparently, all the premises for achieving a national consensus on Moldova 
reintegration seem to be there, however the time will show to what extent Moldovan 
society and its so-called political elite are ready to this breakthrough. There is only 
one alternative to reintegrating the country and a very tough one - continuous 
degradation of the idea of Republic of Moldova statehood.  
 17
Stability and Security Pact for the Republic of Moldova 
Igor Botan, 18 November 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 41, November 1-14, 2004 
 
 
a) Initiative of the Head of the State  
 
On 1 June 2004, President Vladimir Voronin proposed to Russia, USA, Romania, 
Ukraine and European Union (EU) to hold a political conference at the level of heads 
of foreign policy departments, within which to sign a Stability and Security Pact for 
the Republic of Moldova (SSPRM), "with the status of international law 
document"1. SSPRM was intended to underlie "an efficient system of long-term 
guarantees for the entire Moldovan state, which would offer the ground for unique 
approaches to the issues related to the development of democratic institutions, for 
ensuring civil concord in the country and for solving as soon as possible the 
Transdniestrian problem". The head of the state identified five problems that require 
the adoption of a consensual position by the mentioned parties, so that they further 
guarantee support of: 1) realization of territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova 
(RM); 2) creation of conditions in view of the participation of the entire society in the 
free democratic process on the entire territory of RM; 3) cultural, ethnical and 
linguistic diversity as a fundamental value of the poly-ethnical state RM; 4) creation 
of a common defense system on the entire soil of the Republic of Moldova and 
guarantee of permanent strategic neutrality of the country; 5) full and final settlement 
of Transdniestrian issue based on the federative principles.  
 
 
b) Reasons for launching the initiative  
 
Upon launching the SSPRM idea, President Voronin mentioned that he was thus 
proposing finding a "multilateral compromise in a number of principle issues related 
to Moldova's statehood", which can "constitute the guarantee of a long-term stability 
in this region"2. Otherwise, if the parties do not reach a mutual understanding on the 
Pact "this will have obvious repercussions for the stability and security in this region".  
Obviously, this was a warning. Finding a "multilateral compromise" is timely if the 
mentioned parties are engaged in a dispute or competition for the realization of some 
antagonistic interests. The signing of such a document would mean acknowledging 
the existence of such antagonistic interests and committing to stop pursuing them on 
the territory of RM.  
 
The ideologists of the governing party themselves have demonstrated the truthfulness 
of this. In this regard quite relevant is the article published in the semi-official 
newspaper Nezavisimaya Moldova signed by the MP of the majority faction, member 
of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Policy, Ivan Grec. The main purpose of 
the article entitled "Let's dot all 'i's and cross all 't's"3 was to justify President's refusal 
to sign one year ago, on 25 November 2003, the Kozak Memorandum on solving the 
Transdniestrian conflict, after he had initialed it. The author's main theses were the 
following: 1) RM entered the zone of interest of the West after NATO extension, 
which, headed by USA, started to strengthen its military-strategic presence in the  
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South-Eastern Europe; 2) after signing the agreement within the Istanbul summit on 
the withdrawal of troops and munitions from Transnistria, Russia lost the capacity of 
influencing by itself the process of solving the Transdniestrian conflict; 3) the West 
and Russia have entered into a geostrategic competition in the region, the latter 
opposing to the extension of the West through its available means (military presence 
and support of the Transdniestrian regime); 4) the West's plan for solving the 
Transdniestrian conflict by federalizing RM (proposal of OSCE in Kiev) began to 
compete with the Russian plan (Kozak Memorandum); 5) the West holds "the 
necessary levers (financial-economic and political) to destabilize the situation in RM", 
while Russia has lost its levers of influence on RM.  
 
Conclusion: 1) the West got scared that the signing of the Kozak Memorandum would 
include RM in Russia's geostrategic influence sphere for ever, thus devaluing the 
agreement signed at the OSCE summit on the withdrawal of troops and munitions 
from RM; 2) "the Kozak Memorandum was not signed due to the tough rivalry 
between two geopolitical forces for influence in RM"; 3) the geopolitical forces 
preoccupied with the promotion of their interests do not understand the deadlock in 
which RM found itself; 4) "without a compromise, without a consensus, between the 
West (OSCE, EU, USA) and Russia, the Transdniestrian problem cannot be solved 
observing the sovereignty and independence of RM"; 5) it is not President Voronin's 
fault to have renounced signing the Kozak Memorandum, "somebody out there does 
not like the independence in adopting decisions and the independence of the 
Moldovan President's behavior".  
 
There is no doubt that the respective conclusions make allusions that President 
Voronin had allegedly given up in front of a blackmail from the West, which "holds 
the necessary levers (financial-economic and political) to destabilize the situation in 
RM". In these circumstances, the author suggested that: 1) the Transdniestrian conflict 
cannot be solved without a consensus between Russia and the West, therefore "the 
five-sided format of negotiations should be changed, so that the OSCE inefficiency is 
replaced with EU as an adequate partner for Russia, and these should agree to engage 
in finding a compromise in an extremely important problem for our country"; 2) RM 
must "triple its efforts in the mediation of Russia-EU relations in order to make them 
look for a solution that is acceptable and favorable for Moldova's reintegration"; 3) 
"in no way should the freezing of the conflict be admitted, which in such a case could 
last for tens of years, which is extremely dangerous for our state".  
 
 
c) Internal reactions to SSPRM  
 
The Moldovan public opinion showed its reserved attitude towards the President's 
initiative. Non-affiliated press qualified the SSPRM idea as an attempt to transform 
RM into a protectorate of the neighboring countries and of the big powers4.  
 
The main reasoning for the skeptical attitude towards the initiative referred to the fact 
that SSPRM could become "an international law document" only being ratified by the 
legislative forums of the signing states. Taking into account that Moldovan authorities 
took those whom they invited to sign the SSPRM by surprise, without consulting with 
them in advance, it was hard to imagine how it would be possible to get to the stage  
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when, for example, the US Congress, the Russian State Duma, or the Supreme Rada 
of Ukraine would include in their agendas the examining SSPRM.  
 
 
d) Reactions of parties invited to sign the SSPRM and their effects - SOS!  
 
As it was to be expected, those invited to sign the SSPRM did not hurry to give an 
answer, affirming, as usual, that "the initiative is interesting and it will be carefully 
examined". In those circumstances, the semi-official Nezavisimaya Moldova 
published one more article entitled "At the intersection of all difficulties5", signed by 
the same author, in which he practically reiterates the same theses, only completing 
them as follows: 1) Russia made a big mistake on 4 July 2003, when, on the occasion 
of signing a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Romania, it also signed the 
"Common Declaration" by which the parties condemned the Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Pact; 2) Russia shows political short-sightedness because it does not realize its own 
interest in RM, which consists in supporting the current governors, and not the 
separatist regime; 3) USA, EU, OSCE and EC, after "having sunken the signing of the 
Kozak Memorandum" do not hurry to help RM with solving the Transdniestrian 
conflict; 4) the continuation of the geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia 
leaves few chances for RM's reintegration; 5) Chisinau cannot change the format of 
negotiations, nor can it abandon it, if the East and the West do not come with 
alternative propositions; 6) It is more and more difficult for RM to promote a bi-
dimensional foreign policy, therefore, the Transdniestrian deadlock endangers the fate 
of the Moldovan state itself.  
 
 
e) "We write one, while have two in mind" formula  
 
After the breaking out of the "school war", the response measures of the Moldovan 
authorities on the imposition of restrictions on the export of goods from the separatist 
region were not supported by Russia and Ukraine, states which President Voronin 
accused of supporting the separatist regime and violation of the bilateral agreements. 
As a result, RM announced: 1) renunciation on dialogue with the current 
Transdniestrian leaders; 2) giving up on the five-sided process of negotiation; 3) 
renunciation on the federalist formula of conflict solving.  
 
Thus, half a year before the parliamentary elections, the governors found themselves 
in a deadlock both as regards perspectives to settle Transdniestrian conflict, and from 
the viewpoint of foreign relations. Indeed, what kind of foreign policy successes and 
mutual trust relations with the main foreign partners of RM can we talk about, if they 
are publicly suspected of plotting obscure plans against RM?  
 
In order to find a justification of the deadlock situation, the press service of the 
governing party "The Communist" published in September-October 2004 a series of 
articles with the generics "Who and what fishes in the Transdniestrian whirlpool"6, in 
which it imputes to the countries invited to sign the SSPRM, that in their relations 
with RM, they say one thing, but think and do another, in accordance with the formula 
- "we write one, while have two in mind". Actually, the Communist reproduces the 
older, above-mentioned, theses but sets them forth more explicitly, blaming Romania, 
Russia, USA and Ukraine for pursuing setting the border on Dniester River.  
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f) Vicious circle or fate's irony  
 
At present, USA, EU and Romania declare themselves favorable to the signing of a 
Declaration on the Stability and Security of RM, this meaning only assuming some 
moral obligations to support RM's requests. No mention about singing a Pact, which, 
as the Moldovan President was insisting, was to be "an international law act". The 
irony is that the Declaration would have to be signed during the OSCE Inter-
Ministerial Summit to be held in Sofia at the beginning of December 2004. And this 
after the head of the state signed the anti-OSCE declaration, condemning "the 
disparity between the increased activism of OSCE regarding its support of democratic 
standards and its passivity in the settlement of the "frozen" conflicts on the CIS 
territory".  
 
Also interesting is the fact that exactly the same persons said to have convinced 
President Voronin not to sign the Kozak Memorandum have recently met, in 
September-October this year, and had a telephone conversations with him, after which 
followed the idea of signing within OSCE the Declaration of Stability and Security 
for RM. We are talking about the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer, who was then the Acting Chairman of OSCE; US Ambassador to RM, 
Heather Hodges; and the High Commissioner of EU for Foreign Policy and Security, 
Javier Solana. On the other hand, Ukraine and Russia are avoiding giving a final 
answer on whether they will sign the Declaration. In this sense, it is curious that USA, 
EU and RM are making an appeal to Russia and Ukraine to sign the Declaration 
through the Permanent Council of OSCE in Vienna7. Should this mean that direct 
communication channels with the strategic partners of RM are not functioning 
already?  
 
It is not excluded that Russia and Ukraine will condition the signing of the 
Declaration with Chisinau's return to the table of negotiations with the Transdniestrian 
leaders, observance of all previous agreements within the five-sided framework, 
acceptance of the federalist formula of solving the conflict. And this the more so as 
USA and EU did the exactly the same thing, stating in addition that they did not insist 
on becoming mediators, being satisfied with the status of observers in the process of 
conflict resolution. Otherwise, the status quo preceding the launching of the SSPRM 
would be restored.  
 
 
g) Conclusions  
 
1. The West is offering President Voronin a solution to get out honorably from 
the deadlock created after the launching of SSPRM initiative, even though it 
only accepted to sign a simple Declaration.  
2. If Russia and Ukraine do not agree to sign the Declaration, this could mean 
that they are staking on the change of negotiators on behalf of RM in the 
process of settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict, obviously, after the 
parliamentary elections to take place in spring 2005. This might explain the 
outbreak of phobias and concerns on behalf of governing party ideologists and 
governmental mass media.  
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3. The governmental press acknowledges that there is a big question mark there 
with regards to "the efficacy of this document"8. Still, it is launching itself into 
a propagandistic campaign blaming the opposition of skepticism and affirming  
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"it is easy to presume that this Declaration will also mean an assurance given 
by Chisinau administration to the West that Moldova entirely commits to 
democracy and Western values". The state press cannot admit that Chisinau 
authorities have the obligation to observe their own Constitution, without 
having to assure the West about it. Thus, we must be talking about a bargain: 
the West signs the Declaration on Stability and Security of RM, and Chisinau 
commits to observe its own Constitution.  
4. The main propagandistic trick consists in the fact that "public" mass media do 
not refer to the signing of the Pact or Declaration, but of the "document" on 
the Stability and Security of RM. It is the simplest and most comfortable way 
of exploiting the ignorance of the ordinary citizens; it is not necessary to 
explain the difference and eventual consequences of signing "the document".  
5. The verbal, extremely tough, statements about ending negotiations with the 
separatist leaders, renunciation to the five-sided format of negotiations and the 
federalist formula etc., as usual, are not followed by the denunciation of 
bilateral documents or of those signed within the five-sided framework. Thus, 
the governors leave the doors open to go back to the status quo. When the 
President declares a radical measure, the official propaganda presents him as 
extremely courageous; when he must go back to the status quo; the same 
propaganda presents him as a wise pacifier. The courage and wisdom of the 
Moldovan authorities are thus permanently alternated, although things do not 
change in RM.  
6. An incontestably positive factor is observed in the external policy of RM. It is 
related to the evolution from the Presidency's intention in 2001 to "play on the 
contradictions between the big powers and neighbors of RM", to the policy of 
"mediating the compromise between the big powers and the neighbors of RM" 
within the SSPRM.  
7. However, for a future progress in foreign policy, solving the Transdniestrian 
conflict, etc., the Moldovan Parliament should have adopted the relevant legal 
acts clearly outlining foreign policy priorities and Transdniestrian conflict 
resolution benchmarks, thus putting an end to the teetering improvisations that 
only harm RM. The strategic relations among the big powers are characterized 
by a high degree of inertia, while teetering and unfocussed policy of RM only 
creates confusion and perturbations in those relations.  
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Barometer of Public Opinion: deja vu or ... change may be? 
Viorel Cibotaru, 1 December 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 42, 15 November - 28 November, 2004 
 
Since 1998 Soros-Moldova Foundation launched a project on fair and transparent 
coverage of the socio-political and economic developments, on access to information 
for civil society by means of Barometer of Public Opinion. So far, eleven polls were 
produced the last one being released for October-November 2004. Topics covered by 
the research are many: political options, rating of the major political parties and 
leaders, living standards, Government's economic and social policies, other areas1. It 
has become already a tradition for the results of the Barometer to be released twice a 
year in spring and fall. Usually this event triggers stringent debates in the political and 
media circles of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
Several factors contribute to the credibility of the research: 1) a group of well-known 
independent experts supervise elaboration of questionnaires and validate the results; 
2) correctness of the opinion polls conducted by the most credible sociological 
institutions in Moldova are verified by another institution so as to avoid any 
distortion; 3) each new opinion poll includes 30-40% of general questions that enable 
a though analysis of developments and trends in the public opinion, similarly new 
questions that are high on the political, social and economic agenda are included in 
the poll; 4) every time new techniques, methods and approaches are used so as to 
enable the use of the opinion poll results in developing public policies.  
 
Once the results were released on November 16, 2004 media and analysts alike turned 
their attention to the immediate impact of the results, leaving the analysis of 
tendencies and changes for later. Still, it is exactly those changes that are of great 
interest given the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova, as well as recent 
developments as regards elections in Ukraine, Romania, but also Russian Federation, 
Belarus and Georgia.  
 
The latest Barometer clearly shows a change in peoples' attitudes as regards country 
development. Commencing February 1998 opinions on this issue teetered. 
Throughout 1998-2000 the number of respondents who believed Republic of Moldova 
stepped on the wrong path surged from 52% to 82% and dropped in 2002 to 46%.  
 
Table 1. Attitudes on the country development (1998-2004)  
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During the time of major social transformations individual values take the centre 
stage, which are closely related to the social values. Cultural and spiritual changes, 
that is shifts in values, stem from changes in public administration, economy, 
technological or political developments. In this respect, of special interest are the 
results as regards confidence in public and private institutions. This specifically refers 
to the support to domestic policies that determine the degree of political stability in 
the society as well as the level of democracy in the country. The confidence in various 
state institutions (Government, Parliament, Presidency) as a rule depends on the 
social-political situation and manipulation of public opinion.  
 
For instance in 1998 the opinion poll conducted in March showed that confidence in 
the Presidency was 57%, Government 30%, and a low one in Parliament 16%. Things 
changed in 2001 on the eve of parliamentary elections when confidence in President 
was only 15%, in Government - 19%, Parliament - 10%. Table 2 illustrates how 
things evolved since 2001.  
 
Table 2. Confidence in state institutions (2001-2004)  
 
 
In 2004, out of all public institutions citizens trust the President (56%) and mayoralty  
(54%) the most, both registering a 6% surge as compared to May 2004. Also surging 
is the confidence in media with 62% of the respondents having a somewhat or high 
confidence (15% increase). However, during those years the church has been the most 
trusted institution. (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Confidence in civil society institutions (2001-2004).  
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The latest survey indicates what 52% of the respondents are not happy with the 
current economic situation in the country. Interestingly, different categories of 
respondents see different solutions. In general, 38% view that a better enforcement of 
the laws is the solution, 36% developing industrial enterprises, 35% see the solution 
in fighting crime. Respondents in rural areas see the solution in supporting farmers - 
38%. At the same time, 21% of the young respondents age 18-29 see the solution in 
changing the country leadership.  
 
In a related note, given the approaching elections the last opinion poll shows an 
increased interest in politics, i.e. 10% over May 2004. Thus, 28% of the respondents 
say they are interested or very much interested in politics. Respondents age 45-59 
years are the most interested in politics (32% are interested or very much interested), 
as are those in the urban area - 31%.  
 
As for confidence in political figures, several of them registered an increase over May 
2004 and even 2003, namely one of the leaders of "Moldova Democrata" - Dumitru 
Braghis (21% have a high or very high confidence, as compared to 19% in 2003 and 
12% in May 2004); leader of the Democratic Party of Moldova, Dumitru Diacov 
(11% as compared to 9% in 2003 and 5% in May 2004); one of the leaders of the 
Social-Democratic Party of Moldova Oazu Nantoi (currently 19%, as compared to 
14% in 2003 and 13% in May 2004); Parliament Speaker, Eugenia Ostapciuc 
(currently 30%, over 26% in 2003 and 23% in May 2004); leader of the Christian 
Democratic Peoples' Party, Iurie Rosca (currently 17%, over 14% in 2003 and 10% in 
May 2004); leader of the Social Liberal Party, Oleg Serebrian (currently 14%, over 
9% in 2003 and 8% in May 2004). The only one to see a decline in the rating was 
Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev (33% as compared to 44% in 2003 and 43% in May 
2004). Vladimir Voronin enjoys the highest rating with 59%.  
 
If Parliamentary elections had to be held in Moldova next Sunday, 62% of the 
respondents would vote for the Party of Communists. Those are people over 45 
having a low or average income and incomplete secondary education.  
 
The great majority of citizens (86%) believe the President should be elected by all the 
citizens, while 35% consider that President Voronin has the greatest chances to be 
elected as the next President after 2005 parliamentary elections.  
 
Noteworthy, the last Barometer takes a closer look at the swing voters as well as 
factors that influence citizen's choice in elections. Many more respondents decide 
whom to vote during the electoral campaign or even on the eve of elections. This 
explains the growing interest towards media that wields a heavy influence on the 
voter's choice.  
 
Party of Communists and Christian Democrats have the most loyal supporters and 
potential voters. Still, the two parties have the lowest potential to attract the votes of 
the swing voters, i.e. about 25%. In contrast, Democratic Moldova might attract up to 
50% of the swing votes.  
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Albeit many analysts interpret electoral options "deterministically", the opinion poll 
provides a wide berth for forecasts as regards the upcoming parliamentary elections. 
Firstly, it is clear that electoral context and observance of the "rules of the game" 
would have a crucial impact. An illustration to this effect is Ukraine where people no 
longer accept deviations from democratic norms. Secondly, there is a huge gap 
between voters' expectations and contestants' ability to keep up their promises mode 
in elections. Thirdly, it is hard to assess at the moment the possible impact of the 
foreign influence on the election results. Fourthly, "seasonal" differences in the 
respondents' options and attitudes are too obvious. Opinion poll clearly shows a 
dependence on migration in and out. That is why the timing of elections would prove 
crucial in elections.  
 
 
 
 
 
1 The last opinion poll was conducted throughout October 26 - November 10, 2004 on 
a sample of 1,446 people from 81 localities, representative for the adult population of 
the Republic of Moldova (excluding Transdnistria). The maximal sampling error 
±2.6%. 
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Fifth Congress of the Party of Communists 
Igor Botan, 16 December 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, II year, no. 43, November 29 - December 12, 2004 
 
On December 11 Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova gathered for its 
fifth congress. What made the event so special was the complete secrecy surrounding 
it. Not that there was much more information on the previous congresses. It became 
clear two months ago that Party of Communists was carefully concealing its activity. 
It remained tight-lipped on the plenary of the Union of the Communist Parties (PC) 
from the former Soviet Union (UCP-CPSU) which Moldovan delegation was 
supposed to attend. Another illustration, speeches made by the Communist leaders at 
November 7 meeting on the anniversary of the October Bolshevik revolution 
reconfirming their commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideals were never made public.  
 
So, the fifth congress was no exception. Draft documents (political program and 
amended bylaws) as well as the location of the Congress were kept secret up until the 
Congress. Mass media access to the event was limited with only state-owned and 
media affiliated to the ruling party being allowed access. The secrecy went to the 
most ludicrous length as the Communists' own newspaper "Communistul" which was 
to be published on the eve of the congress provided scarce details on the agenda and 
location of the event, and on top of that, was not distributed as usual but only two 
days after the event.  
 
Nor were decisions taken by the plenary of the Central Committee on December 7 
confirming the congress agenda were made public. According to the bylaws of the 
Party of Communists the agenda of the congress is made public at least three months 
prior to the event, that is why those who were really interested had to look for the 
decisions taken by the plenary of the Central Committee held on May 15, when the 
date of the Congress was decided and agenda was made public. It included: a) 
political report by Central Committee; b) report by Central Revision Commission; c) 
report on party program; d) report on modifications and completions to party bylaws; 
e) election of the party chair; f) election of the Central Committee; g) election of the 
Central Revision Commission. May plenary also set the representation mechanism to 
the congress with one delegate representing 30 party members.  
 
Then what were the reasons for such manners that are more in the style of a 
clandestine rather than a ruling party? The answer is - avoiding any scandal around 
evolutions within the party. Indeed, Party of Communists started its ideological 
teetering right after acceding to power in February 2001. One year later President 
Vladimir Voronin also Chair of the ruling party was cited by governmental "Moldova 
Suverana" (February 21, 2002) as saying "I don't want to build Communism in 
Moldova, nor socialism. Nowadays it would be an utopia". And this despite the 
provisions in the party political program providing for edifying socialism and 
communism in line with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Later on, the need to modernize 
the party was discussed by the plenary of the Central Committee of May 2002. And 
finally, during the celebration of 10th anniversary of re-establishing Communist Party 
in October last year, party chair tried to answer the question "Who are the Moldovan 
Communists today? Where are they going?" Back then, President Voronin said "the 
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real strength of the Party of Communists lies in the force of ideas, in the ability to 
argue them and stand up for them". He criticized "left radicals" blaming them for 
"political short-sightedness and naiveness". According to the President, the latter did 
not comprehend that "going back to socialism" by means of nationalising private 
property was impossible as "in the Republic of Moldova practically every citizen 
holds private property". In response to accusations that the party political programme 
lacked the thesis on dictatorship of the proletariat President replied "what proletariat! 
what working class are we talking about when the country industry has been ruined? 
Only a blind would not realize that in a relatively short period the notion of working 
class has finally devalued". Those answers convinced the "dogmatic" party members 
that Communist leaders are following the path of "opportunism and revisionism".  
 
It is known for a fact that Communism ideological rhetoric and principles were 
replaced by new ones. Currently, PC has in its arsenal great many ideas targeted at 
"consolidation of RM statehood" and integration into European Union, albeit its 
bylaws and political program clearly provide "establishing a brotherly Union of CIS 
nations based on new principles". "Moldovenism" has become the true ideological 
pylon of the PC, while efforts are made to show the continuity in edifying Moldovan 
state: from its forefathers like Stefan cel Mare to President Vladimir Voronin. 
Orthodox Christianity has been chosen as the link between various historic stages. 
Thus, Stefan cel Mare was building churches, while incumbent ruling is restoring 
them under the watchful eye of the national TV cameras. Undoubtedly, Moldovan 
citizens have seen the many phases of the PC morphing, the most tearing illustration 
was the National TV report featuring Communist MPs at the subbotnik at Capriana 
Monastery when ladies were cleaning the windows while men were digging ditch for 
the communication cables. The message was far too clear - that is how historic 
continuity is secured and "strategic communications are built" by uniting atheists and 
believers around the ruling party.  
 
The fifth congress was only supposed to reflect in the party documents the party's 
"Transfiguration", which in itself bears some risks. And this because any delegate that 
is a follower of "purity of ideas" might cite the party bylaws providing that party 
members may be sanctioned or even ousted from the party for actions running counter 
to party program and bylaws. Analysts say that in order to avoid any kind of surprises 
inspired by the principledness of some party members certain caution measures were 
taken. Firstly, meetings of the party members were held in the territorial branches 
several months prior to the congress with many of the leaders of party territorial 
structures being replaced by those who were more flexible to ideological teetering. 
Secondly, preparations for the congress were kept secret. Thirdly, Communist leaders 
talk modernizing the party but do not renounce to Communist party name, old 
symbols and idols. It was probably decided to take a stance that would conceal any 
inconsistencies between the party documents and its actions, between future 
aspirations and obsolete symbols not consistent with the future visions but still 
bringing electoral dividends in a country ravaged by poverty. Curiously, 
representatives of the political bloc Citizens' Union "Patria-Rodina" (UCPR) founded 
by two socialist parties and several communist-oriented groups had to ask the 
permission of local government to hold demonstrations in several places where the 
congress might have been held. Those demonstrations appealed to the consciousness 
of the 641 delegates to the congress to oppose the policies promoted by the party 
leadership.  
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One may well understand PC's manoeuvres. What is striking is that the ruling party 
which took control over the main media outlets in the country, kept the citizens of the 
country in darkness for several days by remaining tight-lipped about the Congress, 
which even led to disinformation. For instance, Novosti-Moldova Agency reported 
that Central Committee convened right after the congress and re-elected Vladimir 
Voronin as the party Chair. This runs counter to bylaws providing that only the 
congress is entitled to elect the Chair, it may only mean that the bylaws were 
amended. Four days later, governmental press reporting on the event left one question 
answered whether party program and bylaws were amended. For instance "Moldova 
Suverana" reported that "congress passed several amendments to bylaws so as to 
modernize party organism and re-elected Vladimir Voronin as the party Chair", 
however no mention was made on the modification of the political program. 
Conversely, other governmental newspaper "Nezavisimaia Moldova" reported that 
"Victor Stepaniuc briefed the delegates to the congress on the activity of the special 
commission working on the new wording of the Communist programme. Albeit the 
new wording has not been completed, Central Committee decided to make public at 
the congress the party stance as regards basic principles of state structure, social-
economic and spiritual revival of the country. Without giving up on the previous 
ideals, today the party takes new approaches. Thus it acknowledges farmers' right on 
land. The party pleads for fostering national Moldovan culture, study of the Moldovan 
language and history. Those principles as well as many others would be the 
cornerstone of the new Party of Communists' programme". Media suggested that the 
revised party documents would be made public later on after parliamentary elections. 
This may only be fulfilled at another congress.  
 
Having said that, one may well understand why ruling party hesitated or feared to 
revise its political program on the eve of elections, that is, political program would 
run counter to the electoral program. Why then convening a congress if the main party 
documents were not revised? There is only one answer - to complete the reshuffles in 
the party governing bodies. Firstly, the renewed membership of the governing bodies 
would be able to push through the revision of the party documents. In this respect, the 
statement made by Voronin during the congress is of great relevance: "it was a 
mistake of the majority faction to elect the Executive Secretary of the Central 
Committee as the leader of the faction in parliament. The two positions may not be 
hold by the same person, no matter how efficient he might be". These words were 
addressed to Victor Stepaniuc whose task was "to revise the ideological arsenal of the 
Party of Communists and bring it in line with the realities of the day". Secondly, the 
renewed membership of the governing bodies would be the one to approve the list of 
PC candidates in the upcoming parliamentary elections. After the victory in upcoming 
elections there would be no obstacles to amend the party documents. Conversely, if 
they were to fail in elections "dogmatic" members would be the ones to blame for 
opposing any adjustments to the realities of the day. No doubt that ousted comrades 
will eventually speak up.  
 
As it was to be expected, the press invited to the congress, mainly reported on 
President Voronin's speech who as usual talked of the hard legacy left by the previous 
rulings. He outlined the pylons of the future revised political program, likely to be 
found in the electoral program, namely: consolidating RM's sovereignty and 
independence, multiethnic nation of Moldova, raising quality of life, fighting  
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corruption, EU integration, etc - all of them were reiterated many times. No reference 
whatsoever was made to the reshuffles in the party's governing bodies.  
 
It is all-too-clear that the much awaited party modernization is far from really 
happening. Undoubtedly, the effort to modernize the party is a positive sign in itself. 
However, the secrecy surrounding the congress is in line with the non-transparent 
governing when important documents such as Conception of European Integration or 
other documents of major interest envisaging settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict 
- Declaration of Stability and Security for RM are kept secret. Obviously, these runs 
counter to the alleged modernization and European integration aspirations.  
 
Much has been said about Party of Communists stealing oppositions' best tunes after 
coming to power: right on property, settling Transdnistrian conflict, European 
integration, Christian values, etc. Still deeds tell more than words. And in this respect 
PC is far from having a modern image. For instance, Christian-Democratic People's 
Party one of the main Communists' political foes held its congress on May 16 in the 
Great National Assembly square with anyone interested free to attend. In contrast, 
ruling party has kept even the location of the congress secret. So, we can only 
wonder: how long would it take for the PC to modernize and become a truly left 
European party and convene its congresses in the open for anyone to attend? When 
would the day come for the members of Party of Communists to listen with a beer in 
their hands to the party leaders reporting with a huge smile rather than a grin on their 
faces?  
 
 32
